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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is undergoing rapid
growth in the IT industry, but, it continues to be associated
with several security and privacy concerns as a result of its
massive scale, decentralised topology, and resource-constrained
devices. Blockchain (BC), a distributed ledger technology used
in cryptocurrency has attracted significant attention in the realm
of IoT security and privacy. However, adopting BC to IoT is
not straightforward in most cases, due to overheads and delays
caused by BC operations. In this paper, we apply a BC technology
known as Hyperledgder Fabric, to an IoT network. This technol-
ogy introduces an execute-order technique for transactions that
separates the transaction execution from consensus, resulting in
increased efficiency. We demonstrate that our proposed IoT-BC
architecture is sufficiently secure with regard to fundamental se-
curity goals i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Finally,
the simulation results are highlighted that shows the performance
overheads associated with our approach are as minimal as those
associated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework and negligible
in terms of security and privacy.
Keywords—IoT, Blockchain Authorization, Hyperledger Fabric,
BC, Blockchain Integrity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things is undergoing exponential growth
as everything is increasingly connected via the internet. Ac-
cording to the Gartner research report that predicts the future
of IoT, there were almost 7 billion devices connected via
smart technology in 2017, and this is set to approach 20
billion by 2020 [1]. Some areas that apply this technology
in daily life include automatic vehicles, home appliances,
smart grid stations, health care applications, the retail sector,
industrial supply chains and logistics management, security
and surveillance, transportation and general industrial control
systems [2] [3]. These all comprise a smart infrastructure
supported by heterogeneous entities including web servers, end
users, smartphones and cloud resources, that function with and
without human interaction, selecting and providing information
to the end users.
Millions of sensors and actuators are used in smart-
environments to control and monitor lighting and heating
systems, elevators, and cameras. Apart from this, Industrial
control systems composed of numerous sub-systems, such as
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), distributed
control systems (DCS), other smaller systems, including pro-
grammable logic controllers (PLCs), remote terminal units
(RTUs), and others involved in running an industrial operation
[4]. These systems are composed of various interconnected
sensing devices, and their heterogeneous nature and swiftly
developing technology results in security and privacy risks that
pose a major challenge to the IoT community.
With the widespread adoption and advancement of this
technology, IoT devices face numerous security problems in
terms of hardware, software and network communications.
Increased communication between IoT devices involves large
amounts of critical data and privacy-sensitive information that
are increasingly vulnerable: a recent DDoS attack known as
mirai [5] affected millions of IoT devices. Several approaches
have been proposed to optimise security and privacy [6][7]
[8], but due to the IoTs rapid expansion at a massive scale,
no consensus has been reached regarding the optimal solution,
and several questions remain.
In IoT systems, the majority of communication between
devices is facilitated through client/server architecture or cen-
tralised architecture, through which authentication and iden-
tification, and other security measures, are processed by a
central authority. The first major issue in these centralised
systems, where everyone is reliant on a central authority, is the
possibility of a single point of failure. Second, all connected
devices must communicate via the internet regardless of the
distance between them, thus leading to command processing
overhead. Additionally, the current approach to IoT security
involves high maintenance costs in terms of central cloud
servers and other network equipment. In short, to migrate the
current IoT centralised architecture to a decentralised approach
some fundamental capabilities are required:
• peer-to-peer communication,
• distributed file sharing
• autonomous device communication, and
• efficiency and security.
The above requirements are conveniently available in a newly
introduced Blockchain (BC) technology known as Hyperledger
Fabric [9]. BC is a shared and replicated ledger that of-
fers immutability, consensus, and finality. Although there are
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several other BC technologies, BC such as that adopted by
Bitcoin, but Fabric reduces computation cycles and provides
scalability, identity management, and privacy, which is of the
utmost importance in the IoT paradigm. The cryptographic
algorithms used in BC ensure superior security and privacy for
device data and IoT is increasingly adopting BC technology.
As far as BCs applicability to IoT is concerned, it records
the transaction histories of smart devices in an immutable
manner, thus eliminating the need for a central authority. For
messaging exchange between IoT-devices a smart contract is
used for successful agreement between all parties. The most
promising feature of BC, with regard to its application in IoT,
is the possibility of maintaining a transaction record across all
devices, thus and thus make a distributed and trustless ledger.
Generally, all currently adopted approaches are highly
centralised and thus unable to manage the IoT environment
at the current scale. BC technology has the potential to over-
come the scalability and security issues associated with IoT
through decentralisation. This papers contribution is twofold:
To implement Hyperledger Fabric in a smart-IoT environment
to assess the validity of the communicating devices whether
normal or malicious i.e., to assure users of the integrity of
the data from a particular device. Another important issue is
that the IoT network is growing very rapidly as predicted, and
cannot, as such, be efficiently and securely managed by the
current centralised mechanisms. In this study, we implemented
IoT-based architecture in tandem with BC (Hyperledger Fab-
ric). We tested our scheme in a smart home-based scenario,
however, it will be applicable in other contexts, including smart
cities and smart industries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II presents some background information concerning
BC, smart contracts and Hyperledger Fabric. In section III,
we detail the need for security in IoT with a review of the
literature. Section IV presents our proposed architecture in
detail. Section V includes the experiment results and some
discussion of the findings. Finally, in section VI we conclude
and propose potential future directions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Block-Chain
Blockchain (BC) is initially adopted by a very well-known
crypto-currencies called bitcoin [10]. BC record the trans-
actions across many computers and store in a decentralised
way and thus form a immutable digital distributed ledger.
This ledger is distributed among all the nodes in the network
and every one have the copy of all the transactions record.
Blockchain is composed of two kinds of record: blocks &
transactions. Every transaction is recorded in the form of
blocks and these blocks are then organized into a linear
sequences and form a merkle tree. Every block in BC contains
a hash of the previous block. New transactions are initially
process by miners which are further append to end of the
chain and cannot be modified or remove by anyone, once
accepted. Initially the BC is started with the first block called
genesis or initial block. After then each transaction is validated
stored in the form of block. Every block contains the hash to
the preceding block and changes to the previous block would
produced different hash-code and thus visible to all member in
ID:0
Block Hash:209..AD8
Parent Hash:NIL
Trans Hash:01H...92J
List of Transaction: {}
ID:1
Block Hash:07D..0D8
Parent Hash:209..AD8
Trans Hash:232...9AD
List of Transaction:
{T1,T2,T3...T120}
ID:50
Block Hash:073..ED8
Parent Hash:KL9..A58
Trans Hash:031...8CD
List of Transaction:
{T2000,T2001,T2003....}
Fig. 1: A sample Blockchain
BC immediately. Therefore, the block-chains are considered to
be tamper-proof ledger. Figure 1 shows a sample block chain.
1) BlockChain and IOT: Authors in [11] put efforts on the
case of expanding IoT-devices to a decentralised way in order
to be sustainable. From manufacturers perspective, current
centralised mechanisms needed a high maintenance cost in
case of distribution of software updates to a billion number
of nodes in IOT. On the consumer’s end, trust on devices is
merely a big challenge where someone needs a transparent
security. In short, these issues cannot be tackle without a
trust-less and peer-to-peer architecture that can distribute data
in a secure and transparent way. In [12], authors argue that
in current arising security problems with IOT, BlockChain
provides a better an elegant solution.
B. Smart Contracts
Smart Contracts [13] also called crypto-contract are a
computer program that are used to transfer/monitor assets or
digital currencies among parties under certain rules. It does
not only determine the conditions and penalties but can also
enforce those policies/agreements. These smart contracts are
stored on block-chains and BC is an ideal technology to
store these contracts because of its immutability and security.
Whenever a transaction is suppose to happen, smart-contract
determine where the transaction should be transfer/returned or
from where the transaction was actually originated.
C. Hyper-Ledger Fabric
Hyper-ledger fabric [9] is recently proposed by IBM team
and considers it as an open-source blockchain platform and a
truly scalable system for distributed applications running on a
large-scale network. The main reasons behind this proposal is
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to cope with the limitations found in the other permissioned
BlockChain architectures. Unlike all the other BC technologies
that rely on order-execute paradigm while doing some kind of
transactions, fabric introduces execute-order paradigm where
transactions executed at the first stage before reaching to their
final order. Some of limitations that fabric overcome are as
follows:
• Performance overhead: The order-execute method is
widely acceptable because of its simplicity, but it
execute transactions sequentially on all peers in the
network which may cause a performance overhead.
A smart-contract with infinite loop may launch a DoS
attack, which can severely degrade the performance on
blockchain. This issue is resolve with fabric by exe-
cute the transaction first and then order the transaction
over the BC. One of important benefit of execution at
first is to be efficient and avoid DOS attack by denying
the unvalidated transactions before ordering.
• Confidentiality: As discussed earlier that the design of
other BC technologies runs the smart contracts on all
the peers. However, in many scenarios of permissioned
BCs, requires confidentiality i.e. to restrict the ledger
state or transaction data. In Fabric the execution of
smart-contract restricted to a number of trusted peers
(endorsers) that give assurance to the outcomes of
execution.
The transactions flow in Fabric comprises three different
phases: Execution, ordering and validation.
• Execution Phase: In this first phase, the node in BC
signs and send the transaction-proposal for execution
to endorser(s) (designated peers). The information
of endorsers are defined in the endorsement policy
already. The endorsers is suppose to simulate the
transaction with respect to the operations specified on
the chaincode. After this simulation, each endorsers
generate two values i.e. writeset value that contains
the state-update information and readset defining the
version of transaction-proposal simulation. Finally, the
endorser(s) signs and send the message now called
endorsement(s) that composed of readset and writeset,
to the client. The client receive the message and wait
until they satisfy the chain-code endorsement policy.
In particular, all the endorser(s) need to produce the
same execution result. After this, the client may pro-
ceed to make a transaction and pass it to the ordering
phase.
• Ordering Phase: Upon adequate endorsement on
transaction-proposal, client assembles the transaction
and send it to the ordering service. This transaction
consists of all the parameters including chain-code
information, transaction metadata and set of endorse-
ments. The ordering service organize total order of
transactions per channel (sub-network) that has been
submitted. Furthermore, the ordering service combine
multiple transaction and arrange it into blocks and
form a blocks that improves the overall throughput
of broadcast protocol. As it is known that there are
a huge numbers of peers in BC, only few of them
are supposed to implement ordering service. Finally,
the ordering service also include the access control
policies to check the clients whether it can receive
block or not.
• Validation Phase: When the ordering service sends the
block to the peer, it will enter to validation phase
for further checking that is done by three sequential
steps. (1) Endorsement policy evaluation occurs, if it
is not satisfied then the transaction disregarded and
marked it as invalid. (2) To check read-write conflict
by comparing the key version to the current ledger
state if it is not matched then marked invalid and
disregarded. (3) Finally, the ledger update phase run
and append the block to the block-chain.
III. SECURITY IN IOT
In the past decade, Internet of Things provides an automa-
tion and smartness in our daily lives. Due to the rapid advance-
ment and deployment of IoT in the current infrastructure leads
to many security and privacy requirements. S.Sicari et al. [14]
outline the current problems in the existing IoT and analyze to
the most relevant solutions. The key security requirements are
confidentiality, authentication and access control. The author
discussed various scheme of confidentiality and authentication
in context of Wireless sensors networks (WSN), but because
of heterogeneity and low power consumption in IoT several
questions arises that are:
• Are the WSN easily adaptable to IoT with it hetero-
geneous nature of devices and different applications.
• Which communication layer is responsible for authen-
tication process.
• How to ensure the integrity and privacy of end-to-end
devices in order to prevent from malicious attacks.
Furthermore, access control that deals with user-access policies
and usage control in the wide area network such as RBAC,
DAC, MAC and their extensions. In context of IoT we needed
to deal with streaming of data, Unlike traditional DBMS,
where we deal with the discrete form of data. The problem
arises here is the that the access control mechanism on data
stream need more computation and hence lead to performance
issue. Several solutions related to access control with data
stream are discussed by the author and found the main chal-
lenges lying in it. Some issues are:
• How to ensure that the things could be recognized by
the system where user is not available.
• How to manage with large volume of data stream in
a standard recognized way.
A. Privacy & Trust in IoT
Keeping in mind the versatility of IoT in various areas
that are: Smart-Homes, Smart-Cities, Smart-Health care, Traf-
fic Control, smart parking system and so on. For all these
scenarios, everyone need their protections for his personal in-
formation related to their movement from one place to another
and communication with different other peoples. Author in
[15] investigated a survey study on all approaches in context
of privacy in IoT and find a wide gap of research that need to
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be addressed before deployment in the current IoT paradigm.
The next important factor of security is satisfaction of trust
between parties while communication. This satisfaction is
basically reflected to the issues of identity management and
access control mechanisms. In addition, they put an overview
of trust management in IoT and discuss some past researches
related to it. But all of them lacks a fully dynamic and
distributed approach that can be suitable for the upcoming
scale of IoT. Furthermore, most important missing item and
a great challenge is a well-definition of trust agreement which
needs to be a common language.
B. Literature study
David Airehrour [16] did a thorough study on the security
and privacy while routing in internet of things. On security
in IOT they find out the privacy preservation as a key issue
because of heterogeneity in devices over the network. Due
to limited battery capacity in most of IOT devices, several
devices are not capable to end with the complete process of
cryptography and authentication and argued for a robust secure
authentication system. In general they classified the threats into
two main groups:
1) General Security threats in IoT network: It includes
the traditional threats present in network such as
DDOS, Man-in-the-middle attack etc. However, con-
sidering the scalability and massiveness of IoT net-
works along with their complexities & heterogeneity,
these traditional system attacks become more bigger
challenge in IOT environment.
2) Threats specific to IoT security: These threats are
related to the interconnection between IOT devices.
For example sensitive data & record retrieving of
a heart or brain patient, smart meter reading and
forest-reading. Reading of such sensitive data may
be compromised while communicating over the IoT
network or may be results in malicious transmission
to other nodes for misuse.
Furthermore, this survey study highlighted the routing proto-
cols i.e. (6LowPAN and RPL) and their lack-ness in regards
of security and privacy. Finally, the author deliver some key
considerations for the researchers in order to design secure
routing protocols for IOT. Some of recommendations are: se-
cure routing establishment, self-stabilization, location privacy
and so on. In conclusion this whole study has revealed that
the current routing mechanisms and its standards are insecure
for IoT.
Yuichi Kawamoto et al. [17] puts his efforts on loca-
tion based authentication scheme in IoT. In this proposed
architecture, they used ambient information for uniqueness by
collecting the data from IOT-nodes at certain place & time.
In his case the ambient information doesn’t bound to use
the key-elements such as SSID (service set identifier) and
RSS (received signal strength) for the freshness of data. Such
kind of authentication methods are more useful in scenarios
like confidential information floating in military area or other
secret meetings which is limited to some users. The important
factor in this work is the unique information collected from
different nodes that is further used to authenticate the devices
over network. Thus, it is needed to collect real-time data as
much as possible from many points in order to accomplish an
accuracy in authentication. The two metric for authentication
are as follows:
• Freshness of Data: As it is known that the data and
location of nodes is continuously changes at interval
of time, thus it is need to collect the real-time-data in
order to ensure the accuracy.
• Density of data collection: The amount of data col-
lected from huge number of point will lead to accuracy
in the system. However, such gathering of information
from massive points could decrease the real-time
performance of system.
To uncover the optimal solutions for accuracy and efficiency, it
is needed to evaluate both these metrics for different occasions.
The main limitations and open research holes of this work
are: (a) Real-time performance degradation in case of data
collection for huge number of nodes. (b) More characteristics
features added to ambient information could resolve the real-
time collection as well as accuracy.
Qinlong et al. [18] addressing the issues of security and
privacy in Fog computing. Basically, fog computing access
the benefits of both the cloud and IoT paradigms. Similarly
the security concerns (confidentiality & access control) with
this kind of computing is also similar to Cloud and IoT. This
proposed work is based on ABE-attribute based encryption
and ABS (attribute based signature) which are the types of
cryptographic techniques. ABE process features an access
control policies over vast majority of attributes for user to
perform decryption that can provide confidentiality and access
control of data.
Current ABE-based solutions cannot have the capacity to
authenticate custom (some) users to update the encrypted data.
Thus, to update the cipher-data one should prove his validity
by public key management to cloud service provider (CSP).
However, it would create much burden on CSP in order to
maintain a key-list for identification. To cope with this issue,
ABS (attribute based signature) is used to provide help to CSP
in regards of user validity. For the above reasons, the authors
uses the combination of ABE & ABS for fine-grained access
control in Fog computing paradigm. In the first step, user data
is encrypted with access and update policies and then fused
the data to cloud servers via fog nodes. Afterwards, those
users whose attributes satisfy the required access policies are
capable to decrypt the encrypted data. For this purpose, CSP
is designated to check the signature in order to ensure the data
integrity by verifying the user policies. The contribution of
this research in terms of security analysis are to ensure Data
confidentiality, to provide authentication, fine-grained access
control mechanism and collusion resistance.
Michael et al. [19] proposed a platform for transactive IoT
blockchain applications with repeatable testing (PlaTIBART)
that combines actor patterns with custom DSL (domain specific
language) and test network management tool. DSL defines
the roles that different clients in our network have, based
on the actor pattern. The advantage of DSL model is to
implement a correct-by-construction design means, that allows
the verification stage on the model, to check the internal
consistency before any deployment is attempted e.g to prevent
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inconsistencies: two clients requesting the same port on the
same host.
PLaTIBART uses Ethereum as its BC implementation, i.e
DSL has Ethereum-specific required setting such as ChainID
and GasLimit etc. Future implementation will be refactor these
requirements on other BC platforms, i.e. Hyperledger, formal
Verification of internal-consistency of a configuration file and
a means of defining incremental adjustments to a test network
by DSL.
IoT in context of security and privacy is a very challenging
because of its low constraints and resources capabilities of the
heterogeneity among them. Moreover, these devices retrieve,
store and share huge amounts of data from our personal (smart-
home) to industry level, and thus attracting the community
to a significant privacy concern. In [20] the authors declares
different zones for privacy in order to classify diverse kinds of
data. Each of the zone is associated with context based policy
checking technique, that is checked by Home-Security-Hub
before accepting to join or re-join data from device. However,
they do not consider the case of bypassing the hub and access
the device directly.
A research efforts proposed in [21] that relies of safe
answers or aggregations of data in which the user can send
only a small data as much possible to the third party or service
provider. For ensuring privacy their technique add noise to the
data in the smart-home environment, but this noisy data could
lead to inaccurate and harmful services.
A study in [22] have been done regarding that the house-
hold devices are more prone to attacks by users devices such
as smartphones. As per perception that the router or gateway
should offer security perimeter that can prevent from internet
attacks. Authors shows a demonstration on attacks that pene-
trate the smart home network by a smart-phone applications.
Such kind of attacks could be able to modifies firewall and
allow the external user to directly attack the smart-device.
Thus, it is concluded that routers and firewall at the home-
end are consider as poor protection against internet attacks and
figure out the need of extra security features on IoT devices.
Currently the CSIRO team proposed a new approach of
integrating Blockchain with IoT [23]. In his initial efforts
they use smart-home technology in order to realize that
how blockchain can be deployed to IoT. The blockchain is
specifically use to provide an access control mechanisms of
smart-devices transactions located at smart-home. This re-
search provides some extra security features by introducing BC
technology in IoT, however it lacks the concept of consensus
algorithm that every mainstream BC technology must have.
Moreover, this technique cannot provide a generalize form of
Block-Chain solution to IoT use cases.
In the light of above discussion, there is no technique that
leverage the standard Block Chain implementation for scale-
IOT environment. We argue that this research is the first step
towards a generalize BC solution for the emerging IoT area.
For better understanding we consider smart-home at this time
as a use-case. In the next section, we will discuss our proposed
IoT-Fabric architecture.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In the current literature of IoT security and privacy several
kinds of security and privacy mechanisms have been proposed.
All of these mechanisms rely on centralised approach so-called
client/server paradigm. Using this approach, all the devices in
IoT network are identified and authenticated through a central
point or server. But this centralised way supports today small-
scale IoT network and will not capable to respond in the
growing IoT system in the near future. Due to this rapid growth
in IoT, existing solutions are very expensive in terms of high
maintenance cost and infrastructure related to central cloud
servers and other networking equipments.
Decentralised mechanisms in IoT infrastructure would re-
move several issues discussed above i.e. allowing peer-to-peer
communications between IoT nodes will significantly reduce
the cost of installation and maintenance. It will also distribute
the storage and computation load over the entire IoT network
that can achieve efficiency and prevention from a single point
of failure. We realize and implement Hyper-ledger Fabric: A
Block-Chain technology in our proposed solution. The benefit
of adopting BC in our research is three-fold: Decentralised or
distributed, Permission-based and all-secure. In this paper, we
use smart-phone case study in order to exemplify our proposed
architecture. However it is pluggable and well-suited in other
IoT case scenarios.
A. Hyper-Ledger Fabric based IoT architecture
As discussed above that we consider a smart-home based
scenario for better understanding. In a typical smart-home,
user is connected to certain number of IoT devices i.e. IP
camera, thermo-state, smart-phone, smart-bulb and several
other sensors. The architecture shown in Figure 2 includes
the components namely the smart-home, Hyper-ledger fabric
interface and Block-chain Peers / Orderers. Smart-homes has
equipped with a number of different smart-IoT devices. Every
device can share, store and update their transaction data. The
Fabric interface is used to provide distributed ledger where
each transaction from IoT devices is store in the sequence
and thus output in Blocks. Smart-contracts defines the policies
where every transaction is checked against a set of pre-defined
policies. Finally, the consensus algorithm make an arc over
the entire transactional flow, that can provide the generation
of agreements on the order and to verify the correctness of
blocks.
1) Initialization: Initialization of the network is the first
step that needs before the transactions are made. All the smart-
devices in smart-home need to store the device information in
smart-contract. Information in smart-contract might consist of
every device information and its endorsement policies accord-
ing to our defined policy structure in application interface.
2) Handling Transaction in Smart-home: In a smart-IoT
environment, communication between devices is either directly
or with other external resources i.e. cloud. Each smart-device
requests some other device that can serve some services e.g.
if a smart-bulb needs data from the motion sensor to start
automatically in case if someone get to entrance of home. For
such direct communication between devices a shared-key is
used, in order to achieve user control over every transactions
inside smart-home. Smart-contract has list of all devices in
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a particular environment that can share data by using secure
shared key.
3) Transactional Flow in Fabric: A Hyperledger-fabric
consists of nodes or peers that constitute the network of
Blockchain. As fabric architecture is permissioned, so every
node or device participate using their identity provided by
membership service provider (MSP). The flow of transactions
in fabric are complete in three different phases i.e. execution,
ordering and validation. In execution phase, a client (smart-
home device) send a signed transaction proposal to one or
more endorsers in the network. The endorsers (cf. Fig 2)are
specific peers that are defined in our smart-contract / chain-
code via endorsement policy. After execution and get enough
endorsements on proposal, client then assembles the transac-
tion and submit to the ordering phase where all the transactions
are properly placed in order. Moreover, the ordering phase
also turned multiple transactions into blocks and also ensure
that blocks on one channel are correctly ordered. Finally, the
validation phase checks the validity of transaction sequentially
as discussed in background section.
In our proposed architecture illustrated in Figure 2, we
deploy smart-home based scenario on the Fabric architecture.
The benefit of adopting Fabric is that, it totally separate
consensus procedure from execution and validation which
we need for efficient and scalable IoT environment. The
transaction proposal begins from the smart-device to fabric
interface where it first passed through our defined endorsement
policy in smart-contract develop in Go language. The endorser
peers recognizes and give decision on the transaction from a
particular device and proceed for making transactions i.e store,
access and monitor data. In the next step, as we discussed
earlier that the ordering phase automatically broadcasts the
endorsements in order to establish consensus and is responsible
to make all the transactions in an orderly fashion and finally
formed the shapes of Blocks. Finally validation phase runs and
checks certain evaluation to prove that the transaction is valid
or invalid.
Considers a smart-home based transaction (Figure 2) where
a device send transaction data for storage on Blockchain e.g.
store transaction. The device first needs to prove his identity
by matching the information defined in smart-contract. By
receiving the device request or proposal the smart-contract
identify the device and proceed for further procedure. After
the device authenticated, it may send the data i.e. temperature
data, along with the previous parameters (ID) for placement the
transactions in order and store them to hash chain-sequence of
block. The other possible types of transactions are monitor and
access transactions. Such transactions are commonly initiated
by user or simply smart-home owner in this case where he is
far and need to access / monitor some data.
Furthermore, channel as depicted in 2 is used to connect
two different zones i.e more than one smart-home. However,
at this time we are focusing on single home and multiple
case scenario are out of scope in this research. In addition,
we integrate our proposed architecture with an open-source
distributed ledger known as IOTA [24], that is specifically
designed to power the upcoming future of IoT. It is known
that per-missioned BC’s like the one we used as a private BC
for IoT network is although efficient but in a limited nodes.
As the nodes increases in the IoT network the permissioned
model of BC’s degrades performance and hardly to scale-up in
environment. As it is known that fabric is pluggable architec-
ture for in regards of consensus algorithms. For this purpose,
the proposed architecture in this research is easy to integrate
with DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) for acquiring both side
benefits i.e. Fabric for Efficiency & DAG for scalability. DAG
is recently adopted in IOTA a public BC having no mining fee,
designed for IoT network. For more details regarding IOTA &
DAG we refer the reader to [25].
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we detail our analysis on security, privacy
and performance overhead in the smart-home use case. Before
going to results and analysis section we discuss some reasons
behind choosing Fabric in our proposed architecture. Hyper-
ledger Fabric proposed by IBM [9] has gain a lot of attention
from market. Some of reasons behind choosing Fabric for our
proposed IoT architecture are as follows:
1) Generalized BC: As discuss earlier, an industry big
players are supporting Fabric and make several solu-
tions for it. Keeping this in mind, we argue that our
proposed solution will be easily adaptable by other
use cases in IoT and becomes a standardized Block-
Chain technology for IoT-applications.
2) Execute-order: Previous BC technologies relies on
order-execute architecture where mining of trans-
actions degrade performance. Fabric introduces
execute-order where consensus phase is separated
from execution, which ultimately improve perfor-
mance. For IoT, performance is a key challenge and
Fabric mitigate this issue comparing to other BCs.
A. Security Analysis
The three main requirement for robust security design in
every case are mainly: Confidentiality, integrity and Avail-
ability or simply (CIA) [26]. Confidentially stated that only
authorized entity must be granted access. Integrity makes sure
that the data is not changed or modified at the receiving end
and Availability means that the service or data to the user is
available when someone has needed. All of these requirements
are addressed in our proposed architecture. Table I analyze
that how our proposed solution could achieved the mainstream
security requirements.
TABLE I: Security Evaluation
Security Requirements Solution Provided
Confidentiality Matching ID in Smart Contract
Integrity Hashing Mechanism
Authorization Endorsement Policy checking
Further, we need to analyze the famous attack known
as DDOS (Distributed Denial of Service Attack) where an
attacker uses several malicious or previous infected IoT-devices
and attack some particular target device. A number of attacks
have been discussed in [26] that can exploit the IoT-network
in the form of DDOS attack. Our architecture is somehow
provides a hierarchical prevention from such kinds of attacks.
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Fig. 2: Proposed IoT Block Chain Architecture
At the first level, attacker cannot gain access to these smart
devices because these devices are generally not accessible
physically. For instance, if attacker got access and supposed
to infect the device, the second level of our security defense
is that, each outgoing transaction has to be identified by
our endorsement policy. Thus any transaction or traffic that
constitute the DDOS attack would be rejected and cannot exit
from the smart-home.
B. Performance Evaluation
IoT with Block-Chain integration acquire extra compu-
tational overhead on the smart-devices in terms of packet
communication, time overhead and Energy consumption. How-
ever, these low overhead somehow have no bigger impact and
significantly increase security and privacy. For communication
between devices IPV6 over (LoWPAN) is used in our smart-
home devices because it is well-suited for low-resource devices
in IoT. Secondly, Fabric is a complex architecture and the
performance is depends on various parameters such as choice
of distributed applications, transaction size, ordering services,
consensus algorithm and network topology etc. Therefore, an
in-depth performance analysis is not possible in this phase of
research. This research is focusing on a standardize Block-
Chain application for the growing need of IoT.
However, the evaluation done in Fabric architecture [9]
rely on crypto-currencies and is not directly applicable to our
solution. To provide an evaluation for our use-case we simulate
two type of transactions in a smart-home setting i.e. store and
access. A store transaction means that a smart-device would
like to store a transaction data on Fabric i.e. temperature sensor
data, and access transaction is used to invoke some data. In
our simulation we analyze two types of experiments that are:
1) Block Size Analysis: Recall that transactions are com-
bined and shaped into form of blocks. So the size of block is
key factor that impact the overall throughput and latency. We
ran simulation of block size varying 0.2MB to 4.5MB. Figure
3 show throughput measured at peers and Figure 4 illustrate
end-to-end latency impacted by block sizes. We observe in our
case that the block size of 2 to 2.5MB is significant in terms of
throughput. However, the latency get worse as expected with
increase in block size, but in this particular case we assume
that roughly about 450 to 500 (ms) is acceptable.
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Fig. 3: Impact of Block Size on Throughput
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Fig. 4: Impact of Block Size on end-to-end Latency
2) Transaction Size: We also investigate the number of
transactions per block. Specifically, 1MB block contains 230
store and 350 access transactions. The sizes calculated are
3.00KB for store and 4.20KB for access transactions. In
general, the transaction sizes in Fabric are larger because they
also carry the certificate information for approval.
3) Transaction Payload Size Analysis: This experiment
measures the latencies at different transactions payload sizes.
Transaction payload is actually the size of data that is go-
ing to passed in a smart contract upon invoking. Table II
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TABLE II: Latency with variable Transaction sizes
Latencies (s)
Transaction Payload
Payload Size (KB) Proposed BC Quoram BC [27]
1 0.225 0.325
10 0.280 0.383
20 0.320 0.384
30 0.330 0.407
shows the comparative transaction payload analysis of Pro-
posed IoT-BC and QUORAM-BC [27]. QUORAM is also
a permissioned public BC and based on Ethereum. As it is
known that Ethereum [28] uses mining for consensus which
is slow as compared to Fabric, and thus, not suitable for
IOT environment. In QUORAM, they selected 32KB size for
transaction payload, therefore we also considered the same size
for comparison. The results show that the latencies increases
with the increment of 10KB in payload size. The total increase
in transaction latency in QUORAM 25.23%, while in our
technique the value is approximately 22.45%.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Security and privacy in IoT is extremely important these
days and gain a considerable attention from research and
industry. Current security models for IoT are not suitable
anymore due to rapid-scale, high maintenance cost of equip-
ments, performance overhead and energy consumption. To
cope with these problems, we proposed a new approach of
implementing IoT Application on Fabric-BC. Hyper-ledger
Fabric introduces a novel framework in BC that separate
the execution phase from consensus and implement policy-
based endorsements. Our representative case-study through out
research was smart-home. We presented solution for main-
stream security requirements. We also discussed performance
overhead of some transactions and found no extra overhead by
our application interface developed on top of Fabric for IoT.
Furthermore, a comparison has been done with QUORAM-BC
which shows that our architecture is more efficient, specifically
for IoT networks. Future work will include applications of our
framework to other IoT domains, in-depth overhead analysis
and integration with IOTA implementation.
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